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ABSTRACT 
Chains of disconcerting revolutions that engulfed the Arab World years back indicated the willingness 
of the citizenry to bring the years of denial, corruption, humiliation, oppression to a hasty end.  This 
event started off with Tunisia in December 2010. The magnitude with which it speeded to other 
countries coupled with the debilitating consequences it left behind engulfed the attention of scholars, 
politicians, to mention but two.  
 Using Tunisia’s revolution as a case study. The overriding purpose of this research paper was to 
determine the underlying factors behind the Arab spring, with a particular attention on Islamism as a 
factor. Using the existing literature, this paper concluded that, the series of uprisings that engulfed the 
Arab countries had Islamism agenda or Islamists elements behind it, and that other factors were 
symptoms of the profound weakened political structure across the Arab countries for ages. It would, 
therefore, not be proper to relegate Islamism in these events. The study, therefore, called on future 
researchers to critically look into the underlying factors leading to Arab Spring using quantitative 
methods with open-ended questions, and with special attention on Political Islam.  
Indexing terms/Keywords: Arab Spring, Islamism (Political Islam), Arab World, Tunisia and Social 
Constructivism 
Academic Discipline and Sub-Disciplines: Middle East Politics 
Subject Classification: International Relations 
Type(Method/Approach): Library research, Literature analysis 
Date of Publication:  
ISSN: 2321-1091 
Volume: 12 Issue: 02 
 Journal:  JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
 Website: https://cirworld.com  
  This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2820 
1. INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSIONS 
Chains of disconcerting revolutions that engulfed the Arab World years back indicated the willingness 
of the citizenry to bring the years of denial, corruption, humiliation, oppression to a hasty end.  In Tunisia 
for instance, Muhammad Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, set himself on fire in a totally distressed 
disapproval of humiliation meted out to him by the policy, amidst other socioeconomic deprivations. 
This spurred demonstrations, riots, civil war, political unrest [be it violent or of any kind], and a slow 
political response from Zine El- Abidine Ben Ali’s regime resulted in Jasmine Revolution and 
consequently spread out the countries of the Arab League such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and 
Syria.   
Sequences of alarming revolutions that led to the overthrow of regimes became known as the Arab 
Spring—series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across the Arab 
world in early 2011. The Arab Spring as a term was coined in reference to the 1848 Spring of Nations 
and was globalised by the Western media in early 2011 when Tunisians revolution successful ousted 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and incited similar anti-government demonstrations in distant countries in Arab 
World. The Arab world expands from Morocco across Northern Africa to the Persian Gulf and it is more 
or less identical to the area known as the Middle East and North Africa (Training & Command, 2006). 
From scratch, it generated hosts of perceptions in the international communities and heaps of questions 
on what triggered these revolutions have been on the desk and lips of scholars, government officials, 
policymakers and analysts, organisations and among others. And as they attempt to unearth the 
underlying causes, various factors such as encompasses, economic, social and political have been 
attributed to it. For instance, Dalacoura argued that socio-economic related problems, pervasive and 
profound political grievances were the reason for the uprisings (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 66). Ayatollah 
Khamenei (as cited by Sinkaya, Bayram), however, stated that these economic and social factors “were 
only symptoms of a deep-seated rage felt across the Islamic world against the  West”, but, indeed 
Islamist or Political Islam like Al-Nahda, with its opposing nature incited and supported the revolutionary 
social movements (Sinkaya, 2015, p. 60). What is Islamism or Politic Islam then?  
Purposefully, this paper will not engage in any confusion of Islamism or Political Islam nomenclature, 
but would rather adhere to these definitions. Mehdi Mozaffari defined Islamism or political Islam as a 
religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by 
all means. Mehdi Mozaffari definition made special references to four interconnected rudiments thus, 
religious ideology, holistic interpretation of  Islam, the third conquest of the world, and all means 
(Mozaffari, 2007, pp. 17-33).  According to Mehdi  Mozaffari, the holistic interpretation of Islam focuses 
on absolute indivisibility of the Trinity Dîn [Religion], Dunya [Way of life] and Dawla [Government] – On 
the Conquest of the world, he argued that the existing world is both wrong and repressive and to get 
rid of them, the Medina  Model and the Classical era of the Caliphate must be ‘ideal reference points’- 
and finally, by all the means stretches from ‘propagation, peaceful indoctrination and political struggle 
to violent methods such as assassination, hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions, and even 
massacre of civil populations’ (Mozaffari, 2007, pp. 21-24). In Tibi Bassam’s opinion, Islamism “is not a 
religion based morality, rather a concept of political order, which is not a democratic one” (Tibi, 2000, 
p. 1). 
The repercussions of the Arab Springs still obstinately reecho in the affairs inside and outside the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, whereas its long-run impact is yet to be assessed holistically, 
albeit, it brought down regimes. Anne Applebaum detailed the revolutions that spread out in the Arab 
world as one that resembles 1848 and not 1989 revolutions in Europe and further stated that "each 
revolution must be assessed in its own context; each had a distinctive impact. The revolutions spread 
from one point to another. They interacted to a limited extent——The drama of each revolution 
unfolded separately. Each had its own heroes, its own crises. Each, therefore, demands its own narrative” 
(Applebaum, 2011). 
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This paper seeks to examine the underlying factor behind the Arab Spring with particular attention to 
ISLAMISM, using Tunisia as a case in point. It also aims at contributing further our understanding of the 
factors behind the Arab Spring. Methodologically, in order to achieve our primary objectives, the study 
analyzes the works of renowned researchers from Middle East, Arab World whose work relate to the 
subject matter of this study, and other academic journals relative to the sociopolitical and economic 
development of MENA. This study also looks at the Arab spring phenomenon through the lenses of 
International Relations theory in order to further advance the available theories or fill in the gap (if any) 
in the existing studies regarding the Arab springs and its related issues.  
Organizationally, this paper has three sections; the first section of this study captures the Socioeconomic 
and Political Structure of Tunisia, and Islamism or Political Islam in Tunisia. The second section attempts 
to explain or examine the events using theory (Social Constructivism) from the field of international 
relations. And finally, the last section engages in contents analysis of the existing literature and 
conclusion. Materials for this study are secondary data such as academic journals and papers, media 
reports, newspapers, conference papers and Internet-based search engines.  
2. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF TUNISIA BEFORE THE ARAB 
SPRING AND ISLAMISM (POLITICAL ISLAM)   
2.1. POLITICAL STRUCTURE  
Tunisia, a country in northern African shares a common border with Algeria, Libya, and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Scholars have linked the political history of Tunisians to President Bourguiba as 
principal architect, and his Socialist Destourian Party, birthed in 1934 to liberate themselves from the 
political influence and direction of France.  
On November 7, 1987, Ben Ali had via disheartening coup dethroned Habib Bourguiba and assured 
democratic ruling which Tunisians greeted with many expectations. In the opinion of Clement M. Henry, 
the political nature of Tunisia was an anachronism, a highly developed police state designed to 
perpetuate the autocratic rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (Henry, 2011). Gen. Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali, tenure was characterised by repression, a poor human rights record, the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and growing anti-Western sentiments among the populace.     
Opposition parties had no power to initiate any actions or practicable exercise against the government 
whereas ruling party’s domination perpetuates unperturbed. There was no checks and balances on the 
executive arm of government and, no accountability to the parliament as well. Again, there was minimal 
freedom of speech and press. The state was actively involved in monitoring and controlling media 
houses and both online and print media publications. The Ben Ali administration came out with a highly 
refined framework for monitoring the internet to identify and disrupt political and activist activity online 
(Henry, 2011). 
Furthermore, some journalists suffered brutality and others imprisoned because they criticised the 
allegedly corrupt nature of government officials. Some political advocates were not welcomed, and 
independent activists were brutalised. Also, the penal code in June 2010 through the parliament was 
amended to criminalize the actions of individuals who directly or indirectly engage foreign institution 
or organization to encourage manipulates with the vital interests of Tunisia and its economic security. 
2.2. TUNISIA’S ECONOMY   
Prior to the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was doing better than Algeria and Libya’s economy. Its domestic 
and external economic imbalances were under control. Its per capita income reached $3,720 by the end 
of 2010. Its economy was relatively diversified, with the service sector being very instrumental. 
Agricultural production and tourism sector supported the transformational target and economic 
development of the Tunisian people. Unlike other MENA countries, Tunisia did not benefit from oil and 
gas revenues. Going forward, in the 1960s and 1970s the government became determined in its “state-
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driven economic strategies”, which generated “only modest economic results” and was “proving fiscally 
unsustainable” (Paciello, 2011). 
Extensively, the regime was able to give economic and social avenues and support to its growing 
population leading to political stability at the end. Achy Lahcen stated that along the line, the 
authoritarian bargain, however, broke down as a result of the inability of the “economy to create jobs 
for educated labour, the proliferation of marginal and poorly paid jobs in the informal sector, and rising 
income inequality and regional disparities” (Achy, 2011, p. 6). IMF and World Bank assisted Tunisia’s 
economy but this assistance at the end led the country into deficits. Tunisia devaluated its currency due 
to its international debt. Consequently, the unemployment rate increased leading to agitations, which 
led to the destruction of the regime’s legitimacy.  
2.3. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE  
In Tunisian society, the state has the ultimate power in social affairs. The state controls individual’s life 
and ensures that rule and regulations are adhered to. “Non-conformists” were brutalised by the police 
and their rights were secured by the government of the day. Under the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali civil society increased as part of the general activities of Social Reform. Tunisia ‘s civil society 
comprises “thousands of voluntary associations and national organisations” that precede Tunisia’s 
independence.    
Voluntary associations and national organisations such as human rights, women empowerment 
activities were on a rise but none of such questioned the authorities or directives of the government. 
Women in Tunisia enjoy some of the greatest rights and freedoms and played an active role in the Arab 
world. Among the MENA countries, Tunisia women enjoyed a special reputation which was a particular 
obsession of Bourguiba himself (Hopwood & St. Antony's, 1992). The activities of these groups were 
under the regulation of the state.           
Professionals such as journalists, lawyers, judges, among others faced intensive restrictions and 
monitoring by the security services, particularly, the police. Rishmawi and Morris characterised the social 
organisations and activities as prohibited by law from engaging in political activity and must be 
registered with the Ministry of Interior. Public meetings of NGOs require prior approval from the 
ministry. Some Human rights activists and defenders were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and 
detention continuously. Therefore, with the proliferation of these NGOs’ activities and their expansion, 
the strategy of Tunisian authoritarian regime was to destroy those that it could not control while 
transforming those it could control into instruments of wider social control; this is a common technique 
of all totalitarian regimes (Rishmawi & Morris, 2007). 
2.4. ISLAMISM OR POLITICAL ISLAM IN TUNISIA  
Egypt and Syria through Muslim Brotherhood and the works of Sayyid Qutb introduced Islamism to the 
Maghreb countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, among others. Across the Maghreb, the Tunisia 
Movement has the oldest roots of Political Islam (Tibi, 2000). Islamist movement in Tunisia can be traced 
from 1972, with the arrival of alJama’a al-Islamiyya, leading to the Movement of the Islamic Trend (MTI) 
(Enhaili & Adda, 2003). 
In the 1970s Tunisian societies witnessed a popular Islamic revival and subsequently developed a 
noticeably political nature (Boulby, 1988, pp. 590-614). In education and cultural cycles, Political Islam 
became a factor aimed at changing the status quo. Islamism spread out and became instrumental in 
government sectors, social groups, and security organisations.   
Political Islamism was allowed by both the West and the Arab world in Tunisia as a necessary means for 
a democratic government to progress significantly. In the opinion of John Turner (as cited in Sarah R 
Louden) Islamist parties comfortably participated in Tunisian politics as not only a “cure but rather a 
beginning to a possibility” of democratic growth and sustainability (Louden, 2015, p. 2). 
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According to Willis, Michael J, in the Maghreb, the impacts of Islamism in development is comparable 
to none. In Tunisia for instance, Political Islam has characterised the prime opposition force, it forms the 
most momentous political challenge Tunisians dealt with during the post-colonialism (Willis, 2014, pp. 
155-203). Islamists “advocate violence to produce change by force in a society”, this threat of violence 
is “heavy and very dangerous” and goes along with unparalleled social tension which does not affect 
the livelihood of the Tunisians (Blibech, Driss, & Longo, 2014). Islamism in Tunisia was felt throughout 
the dominating regimes and the developmental sphere, it provided the foundation for ‘political 
authority and legitimacy’ and was welcomed as a counterbalance to the “radical left “opposition (Willis, 
2014, p. 156). 
 Layachi Azzedine stated that in Tunisia, Islamism became perceptible during the days of deep economic 
and political crisis, with demonstrations peaking at the 1984 riot (Layachi & Haireche, 1992). In the 
1970s, Bourguiba's economic and political policies increasingly faced vocal opposition from Islamism, 
and in effect revealed a growing impatience with the rigid authoritarianism (Boulby, 1988). Habib 
Bourguiba was “consumed by Islamist threat to his Western-inspired modernization processes” at the 
close of his regime (Layachi & Haireche, 1992, p. 85). As a result of post-independence, the Bourguiba 
regime used Islamism to ‘justify and legitimise’ their policies (Willis, 2014). 
Azzedine further stated that, in Tunisia, Islamist party Ennahda became more radicalised and threatened 
Tunisia’s democracy, stability and its chances of economic recovery, due to Ben Ali’s failure to legalise 
their party (Layachi & Haireche, 1992). In the early 1980s, Rached Ghannouchi a founder of Ennahda 
preached rejection of Tunisia’s secularism for Islamic and Arab traditions. Rachid Ghannoushi an 
advocate of Islam as a law was reportedly stated that “political Islam” no longer had a place in the 
Middle East. Maajid Nawaz cited Ghannouchi as saying: 
 "We want the religious activity to be completely independent of political activity,” …. “This is good for 
politicians because they would no longer be accused of manipulating religion for political means and 
good for religion because it would not be held hostage to politics… We are leaving political Islam and 
entering democratic Islam. We are Muslim Democrats who no longer claim to represent political Islam” 
(Nawaz, 2016, p. 1). 
In summary, as clearly stated above, Islamism prior to the uprisings was very instrumental in the settings 
of Tunisia and for that matter in the Arab world. Political Islam has been used as an opposing tool 
against the repressive government for long throughout history before the Jasmine Revolution or the 
Arab Spring. 
  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTENTS ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE   
2.5. Theoretical Framework  
Just as international relations theories try to explain every event through its lenses, this paper would 
look at the Arab spring through the lenses of social constructivism. Although realism is a dominant 
theory in IR discipline, one would not comprehend and appreciate the significance of societal norms, 
rules, identities and other social dimensions in the settings of Arab World should the revolutions that 
swept through the Arab World be assessed via realism. Also, realist thinkers have less to say since 
egoistic nature and state policies did not take the better part of the revolution, particularly in Tunisia’s 
case. Lots of theories have failed to elucidate and to foresee events in the international arena which 
involves the Arab Spring; due to the reason that they presume that states have a certain degree of 
generality.  
Social Constructivism, an International Relation theory, dwells on the idea that relations between states 
are socially constructed. According to Social Constructivists, human nature is the core fabric on which 
international relations are grounded, but these relations ‘take specific historical, cultural, and political 
forms that are a product of human interaction in a social world (Fierke, 2007). Constructivism brings 
(back) ideas, culture, and domestic politics to the IR scope. These are all essential aspects of shaping a 
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state’s identity, and ‘identity politics at home constrain and enable state identity, interests, and actions 
overseas. Social forces such as ideas, norms, and rules influence states’ identities and interests are highly 
appreciated in the study of the international system.  Nicholas Onuf postulated that the global politics 
is “a world of our making”; there is a process of interaction between agency and structure and the 
international system is instituted by ideas, not material forces (Onuf, 1989). 
Using the Tunisians’ Arab Spring as a case study in the study, it will be contended that social 
constructivism can effectively explain events in the international system because of its ontological 
position that accentuates that “structures not only constraint; they also constitute the identity of actors” 
(Fierke, 2007, p. 181). Social constructivism sees the revolution that erupted in Tunisia as the 
proliferation of democratic norms, chiefly brought through the media technologies and social networks 
interactions led the youth in the Middle East to become the main agent and force of change and 
transformation during the Arab Spring (Hartmann, 2013). Social networks and interactions are believed 
to be the impelling cause in the happening of the revolution as this level of interaction instituted 
discrepancies. In the opinion of constructivists, the Arab Spring would not have occurred without social 
interaction, as these exchanges both on the domestic and international level mutually generated 
conflicts (Hartmann, 2013). 
Ideas, human freedom and human rights, dignity and social equity inundated the Middle East and 
deteriorated the structure that had been in existence for ages. Albeit structure noticeably sets 
parameters in a political system, these parameters are reversible. Certainly, it might be because many 
leaders in the Arab world presumed that their set parameters were irreversible, and also do believe in 
the resilience of their political authoritarianism……because they felt that their identity and structure is 
secured and that the increased influx of ideas and Western norms via  globalisation could not be a 
threat…but, the agents of political socialisation were expert in influencing the people’s consciousness, 
particularly through media”(El-Mahdi, 2012). The more frequent the social interactions became, the 
more the people were ready to reconstruct their social identities. As Toby Dodge stated: “the demands 
for full citizenship, for the recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying theme 
across the Arab revolutions” (Dodge, 2012, p. 64). 
The Arab Spring revolution was positioned on the idea of individual and political rights. The need and 
awareness for the recognition of human rights and freedom in civil societies—which are up made of 
engagement and social exchange—was a paramount tool for social structural transformation which led 
the people of the Middle East to shift from the prevailing structures to construct new ways or structures.  
Also, Arab Spring revolution was far from gaining grounds in the Western sense of freedom, but, was 
due to a culturally accepted form of control and governance. These, therefore, make social 
constructivism a reasonable theory to explain the Arab Spring and some events in the current 
international system. 
3.  CONTENTS ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND CONCLUSION 
Various scholars, researchers, and other institutions have attributed economic, political and social 
related issues as the main contributory factors behind the Arab spring without given attention to 
Islamism or Islamist movement which was deeply rooted in their settings since the 1970s. As stated in 
Section 1, this paper attempts to be very different from the “attributed” reasons by analysing the works 
of the scholars from the Middle East and beyond and draw a logical conclusion to that it effects. 
To start with the work of Katerina Dalacoura. She worked on “The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle 
East: political change and geopolitical implications” and argued that none of the 2011 uprisings in the 
Arab Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had a predominantly Islamist agenda. Dalacoura 
also admitted that despite the limited role of Islamism in the uprisings, Islamist movements will 
politically benefit from the various revolutions. She argued further that “It is difficult to establish unifying 
causal factors behind such disparate events”—the reasons for and the mechanisms of popular 
mobilisation is insufficient; the manner of regime response was equally important in explaining 
outcomes” (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 79). Dalacoura again stated that before 2011 there was apolitical 
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religiosity throughout the Middle East, but the prevailing effective structures of the organised Islamist 
groups enabled them to capitalise on more open political processes (Dalacoura, 2012). Louden Sarah 
working on “Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential 
Change” contended that, though political Islamist was not the force behind the demonstrations, 
however, Islamist movement Ennahda, benefited from the revolution by getting lots of followers  after 
the removal of Ben Ali (Louden, 2015). 
According to Ozekin and Akkas combination of factors such as high unemployment, rising social 
inequalities, rampant government corruption, clientelism, the assault on human dignity, the denial of 
basic rights by regimes, the lack of liberal values, the change of demographic profiles in the last few 
decades and a further deterioration of economies due to the global financial crisis and food price 
increases, coupled with catalytic factors such as the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi (Ozekin & 
Akkas, 2014). A mix of factors can be reduced to economic deterioration and government corruption 
combined with the suppressive and violent nature of the Arab regimes and the suppression of individual 
rights and freedoms (Salih, 2013). 
Furthermore, Olivier Roy argued that the demonstrators sought for dignity, elections, democracy, good 
governance, and human rights, however, the demonstrators did not take power—indeed, they did not 
even try—instead, they only wanted to establish a new political scene, rather it the Islamist party known 
as Ennahda, with its deep roots in society, enjoying a legitimacy conferred by decades of political 
opposition, and defending conservative and religious values shared by most of the populace were able 
to attract votes as a result of their credibility  as party of government (Roy, 2012). 
For decades, throughout most of the Muslim world, particularly in Arab countries, Islamism has become 
a powerful force, with a profound conviction that the Islamic community is stalled in a state of cruelty. 
Sheri Berman put it : 
Islamists seek not merely stricter religious observance or a change in political leadership but a 
revolutionary transformation of their societies……Since the rise of Islamism has had and will probably 
continue to have profound social, political, and strategic consequences, understanding its emergence 
and development is of the utmost practical and intellectual importance (Berman, 2003, p. 257). 
Taking a critical look at the works above, one could logically conclude that the underlying factors behind 
Arab spring have been understudied since these scholars sought to relegate the influence of Islamism 
or Political Islam in addressing the factors behind the uprisings. How could Islamist party benefits if 
indeed they didn’t take a major role in or were not in the process?  
Olivier Roy, Louden Sarah R, Katerina Dalacoura, and among other scholars argued that though Islamism 
or Islamists Party Ennahda was not involved in the uprising yet it benefited greatly from the outcome. 
This paper totally disagrees with these assertions. The reason is that since, the 1980s Islamism has been 
used as a tool against the ruling government and has led so many revolutions against regimes, 
therefore, without reference to Islamism as a major or minor factor behind the uprisings will be 
misleading if not academically disastrous.  According to Sheri Berman, Islamist programs and their 
engagements helped their movement to pulled a general support while sabotaging the state’s 
legitimacy (Berman, 2003). Sinkaya  Bayram, also argued that Islamist movements with its history of 
opposition to the oppressive regimes gave their backing to the revolutionary social movements 
(Sinkaya, 2015). Tunisia, informed by the tragic experience of the Algerian civil war—also fought along 
Islamist–secular lines—gravitated in a similar direction in the1980s and early 1990s. It was then that En-
Nahda, formerly the Movement of the Islamic Tendency (MTI), emerged as the main challenger to Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali’s staunch secularist rule (Shahin, 1997). 
Layachi and Haireche, also stated that, in Tunisia, Islamist party En-Eahda became more radicalised and 
threatened Tunisia’s democracy, stability and its chances of economic recovery, due to Ben Ali’s failure 
to legalise their party (Layachi & Haireche, 1992). Islamist parties like El Nahda in Tunisia, engineering 
for the fall of the regimes, gave enormous momentum to the revolutionary movements. Mosques were 
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used effectively in the mobilisation of the masses against ruling regimes. Mottos or slogans chanted by 
crowds at rallies and the demands of the people, according to the Iranian officials, were “more religious 
than political (Keshavarz, 2012). 
To sum it up, the series of uprisings that engulfed the Arab countries, and in some cases led regimes 
down, had Islamism agenda or Islamists movements behind it. Other factors such as economic, social 
and political were symptoms of profound weakened political structure across the Arab countries for 
ages. For us to better understand the forces behind Arab spring, it is only academically appropriate to 
take into consideration the holistic view of deep-rooted events prior to the Arab spring without 
prejudice. There are lots of countries in both underdeveloped and advanced countries with similar or 
even worse economic, social and political demands or problems yet they are able to withstand so what 
makes that of Tunisia and other countries that witnessed the Arab spring different if not Islamism or 
political Islam? The research, therefore, calls on future researchers to critically look into the underlying 
factors leading to Arab Spring using quantitative methods with open-ended questions and with special 
attention on Political Islam.   
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